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  We model the stock market as a timing game, in which arbitrageurs who are not 
expected to be certainly rational compete over profit by bursting the bubble caused by 
investors’ euphoria. The manager raises money by issuing shares and the arbitrageurs 
use leverage. If leverage is weakly regulated, it is the unique Nash equilibrium that the 
bubble persists for a long time. This holds even if the euphoria is negligible and all 
arbitrageurs are expected to be almost certainly rational. This bubble causes serious 
harm to the society, because the manager uses the money raised for his personal benefit. 
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  This paper demonstrates a theoretical foundation for the bubble phenomenon in a 
stock market during which the company’s manager pursues his personal benefit using 
his advantageous condition to raise money. We analyze a modified version of the timing 
game addressed by Matsushima (2009), and show that a long persistence of the bubble, 
which causes serious harm to the society, can be described as the unique Nash 
equilibrium price movement, even if the investors’ euphoria as the dynamo of the 
bubble outbreak is negligible and professional arbitrageurs are expected to be almost 
certainly rational. 
  The efficient market hypothesis asserts that for a company the share price in the 
stock market is immediately adjusted to the company’s fundamental value per share.
1 
However, there are considerable evidences in support of the phenomenon that the 
bubble persists for a long time contrary to this hypothesis; that is, the share price 
increases beyond the fundamental value until it goes into a free fall.
2 Advocates of 
behavioral finance such as Shiller (2000) and Shleifer (2000) argue that the bubble is 
sometimes driven by behavioral investors who are slaves of euphoria; they incorrectly 
perceive that the share price will sell at a high price in the future and, not mindful of the 
danger that the bubble will crash, continue to reinforce their misperception with 
increasing momentum. 
  Although the supporters of the efficient market hypothesis recognize the presence 
of such investors, they generally object to the behavioral finance argument by claiming 
that rational arbitrageurs or professional portfolio managers quickly undo this 
mispricing by selling out their shareholdings; their selling pressures dampen the 
investors’ euphoria, bursting the bubble immediately. It might be the case that rational 
arbitrageurs, who correctly predict the manner in which the investors reinforce their 
misperception, examine the possibility of profiting by riding the bubble for a while and 
selling out later on. Given that multiple arbitrageurs coexist, however, they have to 
remain in competition with each other over who becomes the winner by selling out 
                                                 
1See Friedman (1953) and Fama (1965), for instance. 
2See Kindleberger (1978), Shiller (2000), Shleifer (2000), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), 
Brunnermeier (2008), and Malkiel (2010), for instance. 3 
 
before others. Hence, according to the backward induction method, this competition 
quickly undoes the mispricing caused by the investors’ euphoria. 
  The advocates of behavioral finance counter this claim by pointing out that any 
arbitrageur is not expected by the other arbitrageurs to be certainly rational; they are 
expected to be behavioral on some occasions. That is, every arbitrageur remains 
committed not to burst the bubble of his own accord; thus, the effect that this 
competition prevents the bubble is quite restrictive. 
  On the basis of these arguments, Matsushima (2009) formulated the stock market 
as a timing game among arbitrageurs on the assumption of incomplete information on 
whether each arbitrageur is rational or behavioral. The author shows the necessary and 
sufficient condition under which it is the unique Nash equilibrium that the bubble 
persists until a particular time and each arbitrageur randomizes the time to sell out 
afterward. The main result of Matsushima (2009) implies that, in order for the bubble to 
persist for a long time, it is necessary that both the acceleration with which investors 
reinforce their misperception and the probability that each arbitrageur is behavioral are 
sufficiently high. Hence, in this timing game, provided that either the investors’ 
euphoria is negligible or each arbitrageur is expected to be almost certainly rational, it is 
impossible that the bubble will persist for a long time. 
  The present paper reconsiders the foundation underlying the willingness of rational 
arbitrageurs to ride the bubble. We demonstrate a new concept that makes the bubble 
persistent even if the investors’ euphoria is negligible and each arbitrageur is expected 
to be almost certainly rational. We modify the timing game of Matsushima (2009) by 
taking into account the fact that the company’s manager raises money by selling new 
shares to investors and arbitrageurs if the resulting selling pressure does not dampen the 
investors’ euphoria. Any arbitrageur is permitted to use leverage to purchase these 
shares; he borrows money from the behavioral investors on the security of the shares 
that he owns. The main result of this paper provides a justification for the claim of 
behavioral finance that the persistence of the bubble is much easier than the efficient 
market hypothesis proposes; whenever arbitrageurs’ leverage is only weakly regulated, 
it is the unique Nash equilibrium that the bubble persists for a long time, even if the 
investors’ euphoria is negligible and all arbitrageurs are expected to be almost certainly 
rational. 4 
 
  Given an arbitrary strength of the regulation on arbitrageurs’ leverage, it is sure 
that the bubble crashes immediately whenever the investors’ euphoria is negligible and 
all arbitrageurs are expected to be almost certainly rational. The main statement of this 
paper, however, implies that, by assuming that the regulation on arbitrageurs’ leverage is 
sufficiently weak, we can describe a long persistence of the bubble as the unique Nash 
equilibrium price movement, even if the investors’ euphoria is negligible and all 
arbitrageurs are expected to be almost certainly rational. 
  When any rational arbitrageur makes debt contracts with behavioral investors, he 
can take a viewpoint that is more advantageous to him than these investors; he 
definitely predicts the manner in which the investors unconsciously reinforce their 
misperception, and also takes into account the danger that the bubble would crash. On 
the other hand, the investors are unconscious of the manner of their reinforcement and 
incorrectly believe that the bubble would never crash. In this case, the arbitrageur can 
make a non-recourse debt contract that is advantageous to him in that he can force much 
of the loss from the crash of the bubble on his contract partners. If any arbitrageur fails 
to sell out before the bubble crashes, the market value of the shares that he owns 
declines to zero. Because of the non-recourse feature, his debt is substantially reduced 
in this case; he can avoid his debt just by holding out the valueless security. This is the 
driving force behind each arbitrageur’s willingness to ride the bubble and postpone the 
time to sell out without being unduly worried that the other arbitrageurs would sell out 
before he does. 
  If each arbitrageur continues to increase his personal fund, he could assign this 
increase for the purchase of new shares instead of using leverage. However, purchasing 
new shares in this manner does nothing to promote the persistence of the bubble as 
would leverage; in this case, the arbitrageur does not enjoy any advantageous condition 
such as a contractual term that reduces his fear of suffering a loss from the crash of the 
bubble. 
  Keynes (1936, chapter 12) pointed out that the general public misperceives the 
share price and that their misperception is apt to change in an unconscious manner. 
Keynes also argued that professionals who can predict how the general public’s 
misperception changes compete with each other over profit by ascertaining the best time 
to sell out. In the behavioral finance literature, several works such as Delong et al. 5 
 
(1990a, 1990b), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) 
have described the general public as behavioral investors who reinforce their 
misperception with increasing momentum but are sensitive to a trend of the 
professionals. The formulations of behavioral investors in Matsushima (2009) and the 
present paper are the most relevant to Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) and 
Brunnermeier and Morgan (2006). The present paper modifies their formulations by 
proposing that the selling pressure dampens the euphoria only if the arbitrageurs fail to 
absorb a particular proportion of this pressure. 
It is important from the welfare viewpoint that the bubble induced by a weak 
regulation on arbitrageurs’ leverage causes serious harm to the society; given that the 
fundamental value equals zero (i.e., it is low even compared with a safe asset), we can 
implicitly assume that the company’s manager uses the money raised for his personal 
benefit. This implies that the arbitrageurs and investors would waste enormous sums of 
money by purchasing the shares that the manager issues during the bubble. 
Since the share price is higher than the fundamental value, the manager can easily 
raise money for his personal benefit by issuing new shares. Since behavioral investors 
incorrectly believe that the bubble never crashes, the arbitrageurs can borrow money 
from them for the purchase of these shares on conditions that are advantageous to him. 
These two factors cause the bubble to persist longer, increasing the harm to the society. 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 models the timing game 
among the arbitrageurs as a modified version of Matsushima (2009), in which the 
manager issues new shares and some arbitrageur uses leverage for the purchase of these 
shares. Section 3 presents the main theorem of this paper: a sufficient condition under 
which there exists the unique Nash equilibrium, denoted by F  , and it causes the 
bubble to persist for a long while. Section 4 shows a sufficient condition under which 
there exists the unique Nash equilibrium, denoted by 
* F , and it causes the bubble to 
quickly crash at the initial time. Section 5 investigates a case in which both the 
sufficient conditions, presented in Sections 3 and 4, do not hold. It is shown that the 
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, denoted by  ˆ F , is specified as a hybrid of the 
strategy profiles  F   and 
* F . In Section 6, we apply the analysis of this paper to the 
case of housing bubbles. 6 
 
2. The Model 
 
Let us consider the market for a company’s stock in a continuous time horizon 
given by [0,1]. For convenience of our argument, we assume that the company’s 
fundamental value is set equal to zero, the market interest rate is set equal to zero, no 
dividends are paid to the shareholders during the time interval  [0,1], the share price is 
set equal to unity at the initial time 0, and the number of the company’s shares is set 
equal to unity at the initial time 0. 
 
2.1. Arbitrageurs and Behavioral Investors 
 
There exist  2 n   arbitrageurs each of whom decides the time to sell out his 
shareholdings. The number of the shares that each arbitrageur owns at the initial time 0 
is given by  1 (0, ) c n  . The bubble persists as long as each arbitrageur continues to 
hold a claim to at least  100 c % of the company’s assets. During the bubble, the share 
price grows exponentially at a constant rate  0    (i.e., the price is considered to be 
t e
  at each time  [0,1] t ). We assume that once some arbitrageur reduces his claim 
below  100 c % of the company’s assets, the bubble crashes and the share price 
declines to zero immediately.
3 We also assume that the bubble automatically crashes 
just after the terminal time 1 for an exogenous reason, even if no arbitrageur sells out 
before. 
Against the abovementioned background, it can be implicitly assumed that many 
behavioral investors are slaves to euphoria as the following discussion shows. At each 
time  [0,1] t , they incorrectly perceive that each share will sell for the price 
t e
  in  the 
future, and reinforce their misperception with increasing momentum at the rate   . 
However, once some arbitrageur reduces his claim, the resultant selling pressure forces 
the investors out of their euphoria; they stop supporting the bubble price immediately. 
                                                 
3 Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) and Brunnermeier and Mogan (2006) investigated a 
coordinated attack in which two or more arbitrageurs have to sell out in order to burst the bubble. 
With minor modifications, we can generalize our model to this coordinated attack case. See 
Matsushima (2009). 7 
 
They automatically wake up from their euphoria just after the terminal time 1 for an 
exogenous reason, even if no arbitrageur sells out before. 
 
2.2 Issuing New Shares 
 
During the bubble, the company continues to issue new shares; the number of 
shares outstanding grows exponentially at a constant rate  0    (i.e., the number of 
shares outstanding is considered to be 
t e
  at each time  [0,1] t ). As long as the 
bubble persists, the market value of this company expands with increasing momentum 
at the rate of      (i.e., its market value is considered to be 
() t e
    at each time 
[0,1] t ). Once the bubble crashes, the market value declines to zero. In order to keep 
the bubble alive without dampening the investors’ euphoria, each arbitrageur must 
purchase  100 c % of the newly issued shares (i.e., 
t ce
   shares) for the price of 
t e
  per share in each short interval [ , ] tt , where   is positive but close to zero. 
The behavioral investors purchase the rest of the shares that the company issues, i.e., 
(1 )
t nc e
    shares. 
During the bubble, each arbitrageur continues to purchase new shares by debt 






 in debts to the behavioral investors on the security of the shares 
that he owns, where  1 L   implies the leverage ratio, which is defined as the ratio of 
the market value of the shares that this arbitrageur owns to the market value of his 
personal capital. In each short interval  [, ] tt   during the bubble, he borrows a sum of 
(1 )
Lt Lc e
    from the behavioral investors in order to purchase 
(1 ) (1 )
Lt Lc e
 
   
newly issued shares. Hence, at any time  t  during the bubble, his debt accumulates to 




t LL t LL






   , 
the number of shares that he owns accumulates to 
   
(1 ) (1 )
0(1 )




    , 
and the market value of the shares that he owns is given by 8 
 
   
Lt ce
 . 
  More precisely, at each time  t during the bubble, every arbitrageur, who owns 
(1 ) Lt ce





 in the very short term   on the 
security of the shares that he owns; at time  t , he repays his debt by transferring 





  to the debt holders. During the 
bubble, he refinances at time  t  by borrowing 




, and allots the money 
left over after he repays his debt, i.e., 
() 11
(1 )
L t Lt Lt LL




   , for 
the purchase of new shares. 
  In order to keep the bubble alive, the number of shares that each arbitrageur owns 
(i.e., 
(1 ) Lt ce
  ) must be more than or equal to 
t ce
 , which implies  ( 1) L    . Since 
the company prefers issuing as many shares as possible, it is appropriate to assume that 
(1)     ( 1) L    . 
  Because the fundamental value is set equal to zero, we can implicitly assume that 
the manager of the company uses the money raised for his personal benefit. Hence, the 
total money raised by issuing shares from the initial time 0 up to time  [0,1] t , when 
the bubble bursts, which is given by 
   
()
0
() ( ) { 1 }
t
t Ct e de e







  , 
should be regarded as the social cost that is induced by the persistence of the bubble up 
to time  t. Clearly,  ( ) Ct  is increasing, and  (0) 0 C  . 
 
2.3 Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs 
 
  Each arbitrageur is expected by the other arbitrageurs to be rational with a 
probability of 10  ; he is expected to be irrational, or behavioral, with the 
remaining probability,  0   . If an arbitrageur is behavioral, he continues to purchase 
new shares and never sells out before the other arbitrageurs do; i.e., he is committed not 9 
 
to burst the bubble of his own accord even at the terminal time 1. 
  If he is rational, he selects the time to stop purchasing new shares and sells out his 
shareholdings of his own accord. If he can sell out before the bubble crashes, he 
receives the capital gain 
() t Lt ce ce
       and repays his debt 










Hence, his payoff in this case is given by 
   
() () () tt t ce ce ce






If he fails to sell out before the bubble crashes, the market value of the shares that he 
owns declines to zero. Since his debt is substantially reduced in this case, his 
corresponding payoff is given by zero. Moreover, if he attempts to sell out before the 
bubble crashes but other  {1,..., 1} mn    arbitrageurs also attempt to do so at the same 





2.4. Nash Equilibrium 
 
A (mixed) strategy for each arbitrageur iN   is denoted by a non-decreasing 
right-continuous function  :[0,1] [0,1 ] i F   , where  (1) 1 F    . Given that 
arbitrageur  i is rational and no other arbitrageur sells out before him, he is going to 





. Given that he is behavioral, he 
never sells out of his own accord even at the terminal time 1. Note from equality 
(1) 1 F   that any rational arbitrageur certainly sells out at or before the terminal 
time 1. Let us denote the set of all strategies for arbitrageur  i by  i   and a strategy 
profile by  ( ) iiN FF   . Further, denote  i iN   ,  \{ } () ij j N i FF   ,  () l i m () i t Ft F
 

   
for all  (0,1]   , and  (0) 0 i F
  . A strategy profile  F   is said to be symmetric if 
    1 i FF   for  all iN  . 
                                                 
4  This paper assumes that short-sales are prohibited. 10 
 
Suppose that the other arbitrageurs follow  i F . Then, the expected payoff that 

























If ( ) j Ft  is continuous for all  \{} j Ni  , we can simply write  ( ; ) ii VtF   with 
   
\{ }










  . 
Let us define the expected payoff for arbitrageur  i  induced by strategy profile  F  
given that he is rational as 




() {( 0 ; )( 0 ) ( ; ) ( ) }
1
ii i i i i i t VF V F F VtF d Ft

  
  . 
A strategy profile  F   is said to be a Nash equilibrium if 
    ( )( ; ) ii i VF VtF    for  all iN   and  all  [0,1] t . 
 
Lemma 1: If  F   is a Nash equilibrium, then  () i F t   is continuous for all  i N  . 
 
Proof: Suppose that  ( ) i F   is not continuous, i.e., there exists  0   such that 
() () ii FF  
   . Then, any other arbitrageur  j i   can drastically increase his winning 
probability by selecting any time that is slightly earlier than   instead  of ; he never 
selects any time that is either the same as or slightly later than . This implies that 
arbitrageur  i  can increase the winner’s gain by postponing further sales without 
decreasing his winning probability. This contradicts the Nash equilibrium property. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 2:  If F  is a Nash equilibrium, then, at each time 
1 [, 1 ] t   , there exists 
iN   such  that  () i F t   is increasing, where we specify 
      
1 max{ [0,1]: ( ) (0) } ii F F for all i N      . 
 
Proof: Suppose that Lemma 2 is not true. Then, there exist 
1 [, 1 ]    and  (, 1 ]       11 
 
such that  ( ) ( ) ii FF       for  all iN  , and the time choice    is the best response for 
some arbitrageur. Since no arbitrageur selects any time in the interval (, )     , it 
follows that by selecting time  instead of , any arbitrageur can increase the 












 without decreasing his winning 
probability. This is a contradiction. 
Q.E.D. 
  
  From Lemma 2, it follows that if a strategy profile F  is a symmetric Nash 
equilibrium, then for every iN  ,  i F  increases at any time after time 
1  , where 
() ( 0 ) ii FF    whenever 
1    . 12 
 
3. Bubbles and Crashes 
  
  Let us suppose that   ,   , and     are large enough to satisfy the following: 




  . 
Let us define 
   
(1 ) l n










Note from inequality (2) that     is well defined, i.e., 
   01    . 
By assuming inequality (2), we can specify a symmetric and continuous strategy profile 
() iiN FF     as follows; for every  iN  , 
    ( ) 0 i Ft   for  all  [0, ) t    , 
and 
   
() ( 1 )











  for  all  [, 1 ] t    , 
where, from the specification of   ,  () 0 i F     . 
 According  to  F  , any arbitrageur never bursts the bubble of his own accord until 
time   . Hence, it is certain that the bubble will persist until time   . After time   , any 
arbitrageur  i  randomizes the time to sell out according to the hazard rate given by 













Note that  (,, , ) n        is increasing with respect to  ,   , and  , that it is 
decreasing with respect to  n, and that 
   
1 (,, , lim ) lim ) lim ) 1 (,, , (,, , nnn
      
     . 
Hence, given that   ,   , or     is sufficiently large, it is almost certain that the bubble 
will continue almost up to the terminal time 1. 
 




Proof: Since no arbitrageur sells out before time   , it is clear that for every  iN  , 
    ( ; )( ; ) ii i i VF V t F       for  all  [0, ) t    . 
From the symmetry of F   and equality (3), it follows that for every iN   and 
(, 1 ) t    , 
   
() 1 (; )


































This implies that the first-order condition holds in  [ ,1]  . Hence, we have proved that 
    ( ; )( ; ) ii i i VF V t F       for  all iN   and  all  (, 1 ] t    , 
which implies that  F    is a Nash equilibrium. 
  We will show that F   is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. We set any 
symmetric Nash equilibrium F  arbitrarily. Inequality (2) implies that for every 
arbitrageur  iN  , the time choice 0 is a dominated strategy, where 
      
1 ( 0 ;) ( 1 ;)
n








Hence, no arbitrageur ever selects the initial time 0; i.e., 
       (0) 0 i F   for  all iN  , 
and 
1 1    must hold. From Lemmas 1 and 2 and the symmetry of  F , it follows that 
for every iN   and every 
1 [, 1 ] t   ,  i F  must be continuous and increasing, and 
therefore must satisfy the first-order condition given by 









From the first-order condition and the symmetry of  F , it follows that 












which implies that  FF   , where 
1     . 
  Finally, we will show that if a strategy profile  F   is a Nash equilibrium, then it is 14 
 
symmetric. Since the time choice 0 is a dominated strategy for any arbitrageur, it 
follows that 
    ( 0 ) 0 i F   for  all iN  , and 
1 1   . 
For every 





 , then it follows from the first-order 
condition that 

















    
   
()
\{ } \{ } \{ , }
() 1
[{ 1 ( ) } { 1 ( ) } ] 0
t k
hh
kNi hN i hN i k
dF t






   
   , 
that is, 












  . 
This implies that for every 











 , then the following must hold: 
   
() ()
1( ) 1( )
j i
ij






Hence, if a Nash equilibrium F  is not symmetric, then there must exist iN  , 
1 [, 1 ]   , and  (, 1 ]      such that the time choice   is the best response for 
arbitrageur  i and 





  for  all  ( , ) t      . 
Lemma 2 implies that at any time  (, ) t       there exists another arbitrageur 
\{} jNi   such  that 
   
() ()
0
j i dF t dF t
dt dt
 . 








, it follows that 15 
 
   
\{ } \{ }
() ()
1( ) 1( )
kk
kN j kNi kk






  , 








. Hence, arbitrageur i  prefers selecting time  
instead of   . This is a contradiction. 
  From the above observations, we have proved that F   is the unique Nash 
equilibrium, even if we take into account any asymmetric strategy profile. 
Q.E.D. 
  
 Since  lim ) 1 (,, , n
  
   , it follows from inequality (1) that whenever the 
regulation on arbitrageurs’ leverage is sufficiently weak, i.e., the leverage ratio  L is 
sufficiently large, then the bubble can persist for a long time as the unique Nash 
equilibrium price movement, even if both    and   are close to zero; i.e., even if all 
the arbitrageurs are expected to be almost certainly rational and the investors are not 
euphoric. By slightly postponing the sale from time  t to  time t , any arbitrageur  i 






. On the other hand, the probability 








. In this 
case, the market value of the shares that he owns, i.e., 
() t ce
   , declines to zero, while 






, is reduced substantially. Hence, the amount of loss per 
share that he really bears is equal to 











The larger the leverage ratio  L, the smaller is the amount of loss per share that he 
really bears. This weak regulation on arbitrageurs’ leverage is the driving force behind 
their willingness to ride the bubble. 
  We can calculate the expected social cost induced by the strategy profile  F   as 16 
 
   
1
0






   
() ( 1 )
() () 1 [( 1 ) { } 1 ]
n
n en e e
 
    











, provided that    is 
close to the terminal time 1. 17 
 
4. Quick Crashes 
 
We denote by 
* F   the symmetric strategy profile defined by 
  
*() 1 i Ft   for  all iN   and  [0,1] t . 
According to this strategy profile, any rational arbitrageur certainly sells out at the 
initial time 0. Hence, the bubble crashes at the initial time 0 with a probability of  1
n   . 
The following theorem states that if      is close to 0, the specified strategy profile 
* F  is the unique Nash equilibrium; i.e., it is inevitable that the bubble quickly crashes 
at the initial time 0 whenever at least one arbitrageur is rational. 
 
Theorem 4: The strategy profile 
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   . 
With the strict inequality of (4), 
* F   is the unique Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof: For every  iN  , 
* 1
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    , 
and for every  (0,1] t , 
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* F   is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for every  (0,1] t , 
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     , 
which is equivalent to inequality (4). 
 Suppose  that 
* FF    is a Nash equilibrium. Then, it follows from Lemmas 1 and 
2 that 
1 1   , and the time choice 1 is the best response for some arbitrageur  iN  , 
where 
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    . 
However, the strict inequality of (4) implies that  (0; ) (1; ) ii i i VV FF   ; i.e., he prefers 
selecting time 0 instead of time 1. This is a contradiction. 
Q.E.D. 19 
 
5. Hybrid Equilibria 
  
  This section assumes that  ( , , )   does not satisfy either inequality (2) or (4); 
i.e., 
(5)    
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   , 
which implies that neither  F   or 
* F  is a Nash equilibrium. This subsection specifies 
another strategy profile and shows that it is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
  Note that with inequality (5), a unique real number  (, 1 )      exists such that 
(6)    
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   . 
Let us define 
   








Note from inequalities (5) and (6) that  ˆ    is well defined; i.e., 
    ˆ 01     . 
With inequality (5), we can specify a symmetric and continuous strategy profile 
ˆˆ () iiN FF   , which is regarded as a hybrid of  F   and 
* F , as follows: for every  iN  , 
    ˆ () 1 i Ft     for  all  ˆ [0, ) t   , 
and 
   











  for  all  ˆ [, 1 ] t   . 
According to  ˆ F , any arbitrageur would sell out at the initial time 0 with a probability 
of  1   . Hence, the bubble quickly crashes at the initial time 0 with a probability of 
11
nn     . After the initial time, no arbitrageur ever bursts the bubble of his own 
accord until time  ˆ  . After time  ˆ  , some arbitrageur  i  randomizes the time to sell out 
according to the same hazard rate as  F  ; i.e., 
(7)    
ˆ ()













Theorem 5: With inequality (5), the strategy profile  ˆ F  is the unique symmetric Nash 
equilibrium. 
 
Proof: Since, after the initial time 0, any arbitrageur never sells out until time  ˆ  , it 
follows that 
    ˆˆ (; ) ( ; ) ii i i VF V t F      for  all iN   and  all  ˆ (0, ) t   . 
From the symmetry of  ˆ F  and equality (7), it follows in the same manner as in 
Theorem 3 that for every iN   and every  ˆ (, 1 ) t   , the first-order condition holds; 
i.e., 









Hence, we have proved that 
    ˆˆ ˆ (; ) (; ) ii i i VF V t F     for  all iN   and  all  ˆ [, 1 ] t   . 
From equality (6), 
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     
1 ˆ (1; )
n








which implies that the time choice 0 is the best response for any arbitrageur. Since no 
arbitrageur has an incentive to sell out at any time in  ˆ (0, )  , we have proved that  ˆ F  is 
a Nash equilibrium. 
  We will show that  ˆ F  is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. We set any 
symmetric Nash equilibrium F  arbitrarily. From inequality (5) and Theorem 4, it 
follows that 
* FF  ; i.e., 
       (0) 1 i F   for  all iN  . 
From Lemmas 1 and 2, it follows that  F   is continuous and increasing in 
1 [, 1 ]  , where 
1 0    must hold. Hence, at any time 
1 (, 1 ) t   ,  i F  must satisfy the first-order 
condition given by 21 
 













Since the latter part of inequality (5) implies the non-existence of  i F  ,  ii FF    must 
hold for all  iN  , and therefore, 
       0( 0 ) 1 i F     for  all iN  . 
This implies that both the time choices 0 and 1 are the best responses for any 
arbitrageur; i.e., 
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which along with equality (6) implies that 
       (0) 1 i F   for  all iN  , and 
1 ˆ    . 
These observations imply that  ˆ FF  . 
Q.E.D. 22 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
  
  This paper has shown the possibility that the bubble persists for a long time even if 
the arbitrageurs are expected to be almost certainly rational. The availability of 
arbitrageurs’ debt finance plays a central role. If the arbitrageurs’ leverage is only 
weakly regulated, the bubble persists for a long time as the unique Nash equilibrium 
price movement. This holds true even if the investors’ euphoria is negligible. This 
bubble causes serious harm to the society because the manager of the company can raise 
enormous sums of money and use it for his private benefit. 
  Although we have investigated the stock market in this paper, we can apply the 
same arguments to other markets as well. For instance, let us consider the case of 
housing bubbles, where the company and the arbitrageurs are replaced with a mortgage 
bank and structured investment vehicles (SIV), respectively. The mortgage bank makes 
subprime loans; it raises money by issuing ABS-CDOs and selling them to SIVs and 
behavioral investors. Each SIV invests in newly issued ABS-CDOs, raising money for 
the purpose by selling short-term securities backed by the ABS-CDOs that it owns to 
the behavioral investors. In this case, given that the SIVs’ leverage is only weakly 
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